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This analysis examines the impact of age, race, marital status, number of dependents, education, rank, years of 
service, and occupational code on personal discount rates. The study focuses on 3241 Marine Corps officers! 
enlisted personnel between 1992 and 1997 who separated from the Marine Corps through the VSI program (an 
annuity payment) or the SSB program (lump-sum payment). The analysis finds that, although the degree of 
statistical significance varied between the officer model and the enlisted model, holding other factors constant, 
females and individuals with more years of service or education were less likely to take the lump-sum payment, 
and that blacks and individuals with more dependents were more likely to take the lump-sum payment. Across all 
demographic factors, enlisted personnel had statistically significantly higher average discount rates than officers, as 
is consistent with prior studies. The estimated personal discount rates averaged 14.9% for officers and 24% for 
enlisted Marines. This study contributes to the literature in that it is the only study to examine the Marines during 
this time period. Many of the results can be generalized to the civilian sector to assist in fannulation of savings! 
retirement policies. 
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1. Introduction and literature review 
The U.S. government implemented a series of downsizing initiatives under the Defense Authorization 
Acts (1991 and 1992) to reduce U.S. military forces by 25% by fiscal year 1995 (FY 1995), following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the end of the Cold War. The two programs developed to achieve 
these objectives were the Voluntary Separations Incentive (VSI) program and the Selective Separation 
Benefit (SSB) program. The SSB program provided individuals with a lump-sum payment of 15% of 
annual base pay times years of service. The VSI program, on the other hand, provided individuals with an 
annuity which was the product of the service member's years of service (YOS) and 2.5% of their annual 
basic pay. These VSI annuity payments would be received for a period equal to two times the years of 
service and would not increase over time to compensate for inflation, as discussed in Warner and Pleeter 
(2001). 
The introduction of these two programs provided a natural experiment to estimate discount rates since 
individuals choosing to separate had to decide which of the two programs to take. Consequently, the 
purpose of this study is to estimate discount rates for the 3241 United States Marine Corps (USMC) 
officers and enlisted personnel who separated from the USMC between 1992 and 1997 under either the 
VSI or the SSB program. This study evaluates the impact of variables such as gender, race, education, and 
years of service on the discount rate and hence on the choice between the two programs. Understanding 
the factors impacting discount rates is important in formulating savings plans, retirement policies, and 
retention policies for both civilians and military since an individual's discount rate reflects hislher 
tendency to trade off current consumption for future consumption. Higher discount rates imply a greater 
desire for current consumption, while lower discount rates imply a greater desire for future consumption. 
This analysis contributes to the literature in that previous studies have examined discount rates 
exhibited by individuals in other branches of military service in various contexts and over various time 
periods but have not examined the Marine Corps. Our analysis focuses on Marine officers and enlisted 
personnel who separated under the VSVSSB programs between 1992 and 1997 using Marine Corps Total 
Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) data.' Consequently, it complements Warner and Pleeter's (2001) study, 
which estimated the discount rates for 66,000 Army, Navy, and Air Force officers and enlisted personnel 
who were eligible to separate from the military using VSI or SSB during 1992 and 1993 using Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) data. They did not examine the Marines in their study. Our overall 
discount rate estimates of 14.9% for officers and 24% for enlisted personnel are consistent with Warner 
and Pleeter's fmdings (as will be discussed later in greater depth), as well as those of other analyses. For 
example, Mackin (1995) estimated discount rates by examining the choice of Air Force officers/enlisted 
between VSI and SSB during FY 1992/ 1993 and FY 1994/1995. Mackin found an average personal 
discount rate of 21 % for enlisted personnel and 14% for officers. Cylke, Goldberg, Hogan, and Mairs 
(1982) estimated that Navy enlisted personnel had discount rates of between 15% and 18%, based on the 
change in reenlistment bonus in 1979 from annual installments to lump-sum payments. 
I Correspondence with the Marine Corps library in Quantico, VA, and with the Manpower Plans and Policy Division at 
Marine Corps Headquarters has indicated that the ALMAR documents for the Marine Corps, which contained the VSI and SSB 
eligibility requirements, were not saved prior to 1994. Consequently, unlike Warner and Pleeter's (2001) data for the Air Force, 
and the Navy, which contains infonnation on those who were eligible to separate, our data set only contains infonnation on 
those who actually separated. 
---- - ._ .. -----_._-- -----
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The previous analyses estimating civilian discount rates have included both experimental and non-
experimental/field studies. Examples of experimental studies include Thaler (1981), Benzion, Rapoport, 
and Joseph (1989), Coller and Williams (1999), Chesson and Viscusi (2000), and Hesketh (2000). Non-
experimental studies inferring the personal discount rates from actual rather than experimental choices 
include Gilman (1976), Hausman (1979), Gately (1980), and Ruderman, Levine, McMahon (1986). One 
of the most recent civilian studies, Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002), estimated civilian discount rates in 
Denmark using survey questions with real monetary rewards and found an overall average of 28.1 % 
across their sample. Coller and Williams (1999) found discount rates ranging from 15% to 25%, Chesson 
and Viscusi (2000) found an II % discount rate, and Hesketh (2000) found discount rates ranging between 
4% and 36%. The similarity of our discount rate estimates for military personnel with these civilian 
estimates suggests that our ftndings may be helpful in assisting in the formulation of civilian savings and 
retirement policies. 
The methodology used in this study is discussed in Section 2 of the paper. Section 3 describes the data 
and provides summary statistics. Section 4 presents the estimation results for both the officer model and 
the enlisted personnel model, while Section 5 concludes. 
2. MethOdology 
This analysis fo llowed a similar methodology to Mackin (1995) and Warner and Pleeter (200 I). First, 
the value of the SSB and the VSI payment for each individual was calculated based on hislher base pay 
and hislher YOS. The SSB payment was determined as 15% of the base pay multiplied by the YOS. The 
VSI payment was determined as 2.5% of the base pay multiplied by the YOS multiplied by two multiplied 
by the YOS. The analysis determined the break-even discount rate (D*) which set the present value of the 
SSB payment equal to the present value of the VSI payment such that PV (SSB)=PV (VSI). 
PV(lump-sum) = PV(annuity) 
or 
PV(1ump-sum) = {PV(annuity) = C· [~_~(I + /")I]}. 
The probability of taking the SSB option - Pr(SSB) - was then estimated as a function of D* (the 
break-even discount rate) and other variables (age, gender, education, marital status, etc.). Individuals 
chose the SSB option if their personal discount rate (D) exceeded their break-even discount rate (DO). 
Based on the distribution of the data, our analysis used logit specifications for these binary choice models. 
The personal discount rates (D) for each individual in the sample were estimated as 
D; = XdJ + E, where E- N(O, (52 ) and fJ = ii/". 
<5 represented the estimated coefficients from the model estimating Pr(SSB) (except for DO) and 0:= 
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Separate logit models with the Pr(SSB) as the dependent variable were run for the officers and for 
the enlisted personnel because the likelihood ratio test between the unrestricted model (with officers and 
enlisted personnel) and the restricted model (with just officers), as well as the test between the unrestricted 
model (with officers and enlisted personnel) and the restricted model (with just enlisted personnel) 
indicated that the coefficients for these two groups were in fact significantly different from each other and 
should therefore be evaluated in separate models. 
3. Data and summary statistics 
The Marine Corps' Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) provided the data used for this study. TFDW 
is the Marine Corps' authorized system for currentlhistorical demographic and service-related records and 
provided the data on the 494 officers and 2747 enlisted Marines who separated using the VSI or SSB 
program between 1992 and 1997. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for Marine officers and enlisted 
personnel by gender, race, and age. In addition, it also shows the percentages within the officer category 
and the enlisted category who chose VSI or SSB, as well as the percentages of those who chose one option 
over the other by gender, age, and race. 
Table 1 indicates that 61.74% of officers chose the VSI annuity option, while 76.34% of enlisted 
personnel chose the SSB lump-sum option. In Warner and Pleeter's (2001) study on VSIISSB separations 
during 1992 and 1993 using Army, Air Force, and Navy data, the authors found that over half of the 
officers with less than 10 years of service took the SSB, and that among E-5 enlisted personnel with less 
than 10 years, over 90% of the individuals took the SSE. One of the reasons why a smaller percentage of 
individuals in our data set of Marines took the SSB option is that, prior to the FY 1993 Defense 
Authorization Act, there were incentives to take the SSB over the VSI, which were removed in the FY 
1993 Act. 2 Warner and Pleeter's study focused on the FY 1992 and FY 1993 time period, whereas our 
analysis examines 1992 through 1997 . 
In our data set, both officers and enlisted personnel had roughly similar percentages of males relative to 
females-within both categories, about 95% of the individuals were males. Within the officer category 
and within the enlisted category, roughly the same percentage of males as females took the SSB option; 
however, as was consistent with the percentages within the officer/enlisted category pooled across 
genders, the percentage of males/females taking SSB among officers was significantly lower than the 
comparable percentage among enlisted. 
Within both the officer category and the enlisted category, whites dominated the sample, although the 
percentage of blacks was higher in the enlisted category than in the officer category. Within the officer 
category and within the enlisted category, roughly the same percentage of whites as blacks took the SSB 
option; however, as was consistent with the percentages within the officer/enlisted category pooled across 
race, the percentage of blacks/whites taking SSB among officers was significantly lower than the 
comparable percentage among enlisted. 
Although the largest percentage of individuals within the officer category and within the enlisted 
category were in the 31-35 age range, the enlisted category had a much higher percentage in the 22-30 
2 As discussed in Warner and Pleeter (200 I), SSB required only a three year commitment in the Ready Reserve, while VSI 
required that the recipient be affiliated with the reserves during the life of the payment stream. SSB recipients received a longer 
extension of medical coverage, moving benefits, etc. (pp. 35-36). 
--------------------------
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Table I 
Summary statistics for Marine officers and enlisted by gender, race, and age 
Variable Percent (number) Percent (number) taking SSB Percent (number) Percent (number) taking SSB 
among officers among officers among enlisted among enlisted 
Option chosen 
SSB 38.26 (189) 38.26 76.34 (2097) 76.34 
VSI 61.74 (305) 61. 74 23.66 (650) 23.66 
Gender 
Male 95.14 (470) 38.51 (181) 94.61 (2599) 76.68 (1993) 
Female 4.86 (23) 33.33 (8) 5.39 ( 148) 70.27 ( 104) 
Race 
White 93.12 (460) 37.39 (172) 73.24 (2012) 75.05 (1510) 
Black 4.66 (23) 43.48 (10) 21.62 (594) 79.80 (474) 
Other 0.002 (I) 0 0.33 (9) 88.89 (8) 
Age 
22- 30 9.72 (48) 52.08 (25) 36.02 (989) 86.45 (855) 
31- 35 67.21 (332) 38.25 (127) 47.43 (1303) 73.52 (958) 
36- 40 21.26 (105) 35.24 (37) 14.34 (394) 62.18 (245) 
41 - 44 1.81 (9) 0 2.21 (61) 63.93 (39) 
age range (36%) than the officers did (9.72%). Within both the officer category and the enlisted category, 
the youngest officers were the most likely to take the SSB (the lump-sum payment), although the 
percentage of individuals in each age range for enlisted personnel taking the SSB was almost twice that of 
the individuals of comparable age in the officer category. 
The summary statistics for Marine officers and enlisted personnel by educational level, marital status, 
and number of dependents are provided in Table 2. In addition, within each of these categories and by 
Table 2 
Summary statist ics for Marine officers and enlislcd by education level. manlal status, and number of dependents 
Variable Percent (number) Percent (number) taking Percent (number) Percent (number) taking 
among officers SSB among officers among enlisted SSB among enlisted 
Education level 
Enlisted: < HS 0.51 (14) 71.43 (10) 
Enlisted: HS or equivalent 9.97 (274) 72.99 (200) 
Enlisted: > HS 89.52 (2459) 76.74 (1887) 
Officers: 83.20 (411) 42.09 (J 73) 
Bachelors 
Officers: > Bachelors 16.80 (83) 19.28 (16) 
Marital slaWs 
Married 80.77 (399) 38.10 (152) 81.54 (2240) 76.47 (1713) 
Single 19.23 (95) 38.95 (37) 18.64 (507) 75.74 (384) 
Number of dependents 
0-3 77.94 (385) 37.92 ( 146) 76.99 (2115) 77.02 (1629) 
>3 22.06 (109) 39.45 (43) 23.01 (632) 74.05 (468) 
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officers/enlisted, the table shows the percentage of individuals who took the SSB option (the lump-sum 
payment). For enlisted personnel, as the education level increased from less than a high school diploma 
to greater than a high school diploma, the percentage taking the SSB option increased. On the other 
hand, for officers, as the educational level increased from a bachelors degree to greater than a bachelor's 
degree, the percentage taking SSB dropped dramatically. This suggests that there may be a certain level 
of education (a high school diploma or higher) prior to which the probability of taking SSB increases as 
education increases, but that education beyond that level contributes to a decreasing probability of 
taking SSB . 
Within the enlisted category and within the officer category, the percentage of individuals taking the 
SSB does not differ significantly between those who are married and those who are single or between 
those who have between 0 and 3 dependents and those who have more than 3 dependents. Consistent with 
the descriptive statistics in Table I, the percentage taking the SSB for enlisted personnel, regardless of 
category (education, marital status, or number of dependents), was usually almost twice the percentage of 
officers taking the SSB option within the comparable category. 
The summary statistics for Marine officers and enlisted personnel by rank, occupational code (MaS), 
and years of service (YOS) are provided in Table 3. Consistent with the descriptive statistics in Tables I 
and 2, the percentage taking the SSB for enlisted personnel , regardless of category (rank, MaS, or YOS), 
was usually almost twice the percentage of officers taking the SSB option within the comparable category. 
Within the rank category, as rank increased, the percentage of individuals taking the SSB option declined 
within both the enlisted personnel category and the officer category. Although the percentage taking the 
SSB across different occupational codes (MOSs) did not differ within the enlisted category, a higher 
percentage of individuals within the officer category in the combat arms MaS took the SSB relative to 
Table 3 
Summary statistics for Marine officers and enlisted by rank, MOS, and yaS 
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individuals in the combat anns support or the aviation MOS. As years of service increased, within both 
the officer and the enlisted categories, the percentage taking the SSB declined, although the decline was 
steeper as years of service increased for officers than for enlisted personnel. 
4. Estimation results 
4.1. A. Officer and enlisted estimation results 
The results of the logit model estimating the probability of taking the SSB (lump-sum) option by 
Marine officers are displayed in Table 4. The binary choice regression models in Tables 4 and 5 contribute 
to our understanding of the interplay of various factors on the discount rate because they enable an 
examination of the impact of one factor on the probability of choosing the SSB option, while holding the 
other factors constant. Graduate education had a highly statistically significant negative effect (at the 1% 
level) on a Marine officer's probability of selecting the lump-sum payment option. At higher educational 
levels, the probability of an officer taking the SSB was lower. Indeed, the partial effects of a graduate 
education show that officers with a level of education greater than a bachelor's degree were 0.1819 less 
likely to choose the SSB payment plan. Out of 83 officers who had educational levels higher than a 
Table 4 
Marine officer estimation using logit models with Pr(SSB) as the dependent variable 
Variable Parameter estimate Standard error Pr> x8 Partial effects 
Intercept - 1.2738 6.4373 0.8431 0 
SEU992 - 1.7505 0.9 145 0.0556' - 0.241 
SEP _1994 1.0123 0.4827 0.0360" 0.2436 
SEP_1995 0.9328 1.3131 0.4775 0.2239 
SEP_1996 17.991 5 1282.8 0.9888 0.6851 
SEP_1997 0 0 0 0 
FEMALE - 0.1292 0.5052 0.7981 - 0.0272 
BLK 0.3207 0.4688 0.494 0.0729 
OTHEILMI NORITY - 18.746 1263.3 0.9882 - 0.3149 
SINGLE - 0.01 61 0.2778 0.9539 -0.0035 
NUMBER..DEPENDENTS 0.0409 0.0648 0.5287 0.0089 
03E 0. 1227 0.432 0.7763 0.027 1 
FIELD_GRADE - 0.0339 0.4993 0.9459 - 0.0073 
COMBALSERVICE-SUPPORT -0.1068 0.2488 0.6677 -0.0226 
AVIATION - 0. 1588 0.244 0.515 -0.0332 
GRADUATE-EDUCATION - 1.0972 0.3227 0.0007·" -0.1819 
UNEMPLOYMENT...RATE 1.3875 0.473 0.0034·" 0.3331 
AGE 0.0211 0.0599 0.725 0.0046 
YOS - 0.0314 0.1183 0.7907 - 0.0067 
BEDR - 56.5252 40.0285 0.1579 -0.3133 
R' 0.1038 
Max rescaled R2 0.1411 
Number of observations 494 
• Coefficient is Significant alIne 0.10 level . 
... Coefficient is significant al the 0.05 level. 
.... Coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level. 
. within both 
decline was 
1) option by 
5 contribute 
:y enable an 
: holding the 
et (at the 1% 
. educational 
,f a graduate 
, 0.1819 less 


























N. Hensel, M. Deichert I Review oj Financial Economics 17 (2008) 62-78 69 
bachelor's degree, 67 of them, or 80.7%, decided to take the VSI payment. This suggests that better-
educated officers were better able to recognize that an annuity-type payment offered them greater 
monetary value relative to a lump-sum payment. This rmding is consistent with Warner and Pleeter's 
(200 I) officer model of the probability of choosing the SSB option, which found that graduate education 
had a statistically significant negative effect. Harrison et al. (2002), in their study of Danish civilians, also 
found that individuals with higher levels of education had statistically significantly lower discount rates. 
Gilman (1976) and Black (1984) also found that discount rates declined as education increased. 
The unemployment rate faced by Marine officers at their time of separation had a statistically 
significant positive effect on their decision to choose the lump-sum payment option. The partial effects of 
the unemployment rate reveal that, as the rate of unemployment increased by 0.1 %, the officers were 
0.3331 more likely to take the SSB payment than officers who faced the average unemployment rate of 
6.5%. The data showed that 121 out of the 283 officers, who faced a higher than average unemployment 
rate upon separation from the Marine Corps, selected the lump-sum payment option. 
A number of other factors which, in the summary statistics tables, suggested different propensities to 
take the SSB (lump-sum payment) had the anticipated sign but were statistically insignificant in the binary 
choice officer model partially since other factors were controlled for in the regression. These factors 
included YOS, gender, number of dependents, and race. Females may have been less likely to take the 
SSB option (negative sign on the coefficient), although the result was not statistically significant, which is 
consistent with Warner and Pleeter's (200 I) negative, statistically insignificant effect for females. Blacks, 
as in other studies, may have been more likely to take the SSB option (positive sign on the coefficient), 
although the result was not statistically significant; Warner and Pleeter' analysis had a positive, 
statistically significant effect for blacks. As yaS increased, the tendency to take the SSB option declined 
(negative sign on the coefficient), although the result was not statistically significant. Finally, as the 
number of dependents increased, individuals were more likely to take the SSB option (positive sign on the 
coefficient), although the result was not statistically significant; in Warner and Pleeter's officer model, the 
number of dependents had a positive, statistically significant effect. In our analysis, military rank served 
as our proxy for wages/income, and field grade officers had a lower probability of choosing the SSB 
option, although the effect was not statistically significant. Similarly, Warner and Pleeter's officer model 
suggested a negative, statistically insignificant relationship between wages and the probability of taking 
the SSB option. Harrison et al. (2002) showed that average discount rates for various income brackets 
declined as income increased. 
Table 5 displays the estimation results for Marine enlisted personnel from the logit model estimating 
the probability of taking the SSB (the lump-sum payment) as a function of various characteristics. Several 
of the effects which had the sanle sign in both the officer and the enlisted model and which were not 
statistically significant in the officer model were significant in the enlisted model. 
Gender had a statistically significant negative effect (at the 10% level) on the probability of taking SSB 
in that women were less likely to take the lump-sum payment than men. The sign was the same as the 
corresponding coefficient in the officer model, but the officer results were not statistically significant. 
Warner and Pleeter's (200 I) study similarly found a statistically significant gender effect in their enlisted 
model, but not in their officer model. In our analysis, a female enlisted Marine was 0.0581 less likely to 
choose the SSB payment plan upon separation. Possibly this was because female Marines leaving the 
service may have expected to earn less in their civilian employment, so they could not afford to take the 
lower amount of money offered by the lump-sum payment option. Ehrenberg and Smith (2003) suggested 
that the wages of women in a civilian job are likely to be lower than those of men . 
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Table 5 
Marine enlisted results using logit models with Pr(SSB) as the dependent variable 
Variable Parameter estimate Standard error Pr>/ Partial effects 
Intercept 4.8912 3.2809 0.136 0 
SEP_1993 - 0.1121 0.1413 0.4277 - 0.0161 
SEP_1994 - 1.0514 0.2586 <0.0001"· -0.1964 
SEP_1995 0 0 a a 
SEP_1996 a 0 0 a 
SEP_1997 10.8976 331.8 0.9738 0.1653 
FEMALE -0.3735 0.2013 0.0635' - 0.0581 
BLK 0.3283 0. 1211 0.0067"· 0.0405 
OTIIE~MINORITY 0.5582 1.0801 0.6053 0.0635 
SINGLE - 0.0361 0. 1392 0.7955 - 0.005 
NUMBEILDEPENDENTS 0.0691 0.0357 0.0531' 0.0093 
E4 - 0.4599 0.422 0.2758 -0.0735 
E6 - 0.1443 0. 1432 0.3136 -0.0209 
E7 -0.0483 0.2402 0. 8405 -0.0068 
COMBAT..5ERVICE..5UPPORT -0. 1419 0.1443 0.3255 - 0.0205 
AVIATION -0. 1999 0.1515 0.1868 -0.0295 
LT _liS_DIPLOMA -0.456 0.624 1 0.4649 -0.0728 
GLIIS_DIPLOMA - 0.0268 0.1527 0.8605 - 0.0202 
UNEM PLOYMENT-RATE 0.2403 0.2059 0.243 0.0306 
AGE - 0.0366 0.021 0.0812' - 0.005 1 
YOS - 0.1128 0.0458 0.0138" -0.0162 
BEDR - 16.1874 19.5102 0.4067 - 0.3346 
R' 0.0766 
Max rescaled Rl 0.1152 
Number of observations 2747 
.. Coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level. 
•• Coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level. 
... Coefficient is significant al the 0.0 1 level. 
Blacks were statistically significantly more likely (at the I % level) to choose the SSB program, despite 
controlling for educational and financial status (as measured by rank). In the enlisted data, the educational 
levels and the distribution across ranks for blacks and whites were very similar. 3 The sign was the same as 
the corresponding coefficient in the officer model, but the officer results were not statistically significant. 
Black enlisted Marines were 0.0405 more likely to choose the lump-sum payment than white enlisted 
Marines. This finding is consistent with Warner and Pleeter's (2001) finding that blacks had a higher 
propensity to take the lump-sum payment and to have correspondingly higher personal discount rates. 
Warner and Pleeter suggested that this may possibly occur because blacks may not be able to borrow 
money at low interest rates due to educational or income obstacles. 
J Approximately 53.5% of blacks and 4')<'10 of whi les were in the lowest two ranks - corporal and sergeant - in. the enlisted 
data. Blacks had 0.7% of enlisted personnel with less than a high school diploma, compared to 0.5% for whites. About II % of 
white enlisted Marines and about 7% of black enlisted Marines had a high school equivalent degree. About 92% of black 
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Table 6a 
Mean implied PDR tor Marine officers/enlisted by gender, race, marital status, number of dependents. and age 
Variable Mean PDR officers Standard deviation Mean PDR enlisted Standard deviation 
Gender 
Male 0.1494 0.0159 0.2412 0.0397 
Female 0.1437 0.01 3 0.2177 0.0317 
Race 
White 0.1488 0.01 61 0.236 0.0396 
Black 0.1536 0.0112 0.2534 0.0374 
Other minority 0 0 0.2866 0.0214 
Marital status 
Married 0.1492 0.0171 0.2406 0.038 
Single 0. 1488 0.0084 0.2373 0.0463 
Number of dependents 
0- 3 0.1492 0.01 71 0.2401 0.0403 
>3 0.1489 0.0104 0.2395 0.0373 
Age 
22- 30 0.1524 0.0084 0.2697 0.0224 
31 - 35 0.149 0.0093 0.2318 0.0358 
36-40 0.1488 0.0291 0.2014 0.0297 
41 - 46 0.1389 0.0143 0.183 0.0305 
The number of dependents had a pOSItIve, statistically significant effect (at the 10% level) on the 
probability of the individual taking the SSB. The coefficient in the officer model was the same sign as in 
the enlisted model but was not statistically significant. This study and Warner and Pleeter's (2001) study 
are among the few which link discount rates to family size. Warner and Pleeter similarly found a 
statistically significant positive effect for number of dependents in their enlisted model. For every increase 
by one in the number of dependents an enlisted Marine had, the likelihood of the SSB option being chosen 
increased by 0.0093. Our data showed that at each level of number of dependents, which in the data set 
ranged from 0 to 12, the percentage of enlisted Marines who took the lump-sum payment was consistently 
higher than those who opted for the annuity payment. 4 This may possibly have been due to Marines with 
larger families having greater financial obligations during their transition out of the military and therefore 
needing the money immediately upon transitioning out. 
Age had a statistically significant negative effect (at the 10% level) on the probability of an enlisted 
Marine taking the SSB (lump-sum) option. As a Marine's age increased by I year, the probability of that 
person selecting the SSB payment decreased by 0.0051. The data showed that from age 30 through 46, 
there was a decline in the percentage of SSB takers with every one-year increase in age. Marines in this 
age bracket constituted 75.8% of the enlisted sample. Warner and Pleeter (2001) similarly found a 
4 The only exception is at the eight-child level, where 50% of the Marines took. the SSB payment and the other half took the 
VSI payment 
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statistically significant negative age effect in their enlisted model. Moreover, Harrison et al. (2002) also 
found that average discount rates decline with age for individuals under 50. 
The number of years of service (YOS) in the Marine Corps had a statistically significant negative effect 
(at the 5% level) on the likelihood of an individual choos ing the SSB option. The partial effect for the 
YOS variable was a negative 0.0162. One explanation for this was that, bolding education, race, and 
gender constant, an individual with more years of service in the mili tary might have heen more likely to 
quickly get a job after leaving the Marines due to more work experience and hence would have been less 
likely to need the SSB (lump-sum payment) to assist financially since the job searching time would have 
decreased. Warner and Pleeter's (200 I) enlisted model also had a positive effect for YOS, althOUgh, 
unlike our enlisted model, the effect was not statistically significant. 
4.2. B. Personal discount rate estimates fo r officers and enlisted personnel 
The estimation results from Tables 4 and 5 were used to estimate a personal discount rate (PDR) for 
each Marine officer and enlisted individual in the sample. Tables 6a and 6b show the average of these 
personal discount rates by characteristic (age, gender, etc.) among officers and among enlisted personnel. 
Tables 6c, 6d, and 6e show the t-statistics for the di fferences of the average means by characteristic 
between the oflicer group and the enlisted group, as well as within each group. 
Table fib 
Mean impl ied PDR fo r Marine omcers/enlisted by rank, MOS. educational level, and yaS 
Variable Mean POR officers Standard deviation Mean PDR enlisted Standard deviation 
Rank 
E4 0.2743 0.0139 
E5 0.2629 0.0318 
E6 0.2 165 0.0333 
E7 0.2113 0.0239 
03 0.1494 0.0092 
03E 0.158 1 0.0417 
Field grade 0.1399 0.0124 
MOS 
Combat arms 0.1513 0.0096 0.248 0.0347 
Combat service support 0.1486 0.0239 0.2353 0.0424 
Avi~tion 0.1472 0.0084 0.2427 0.037 
Education level 
LT liS diploma 0.2216 0.0288 
EQUIV liS diploma 0.2294 0.0364 
GT lIS diploma 0.24!3 0.0398 
Bachelor's degree 0.1519 0.0067 
Graduate education 0.1353 0.0323 
YOS 
4- 10 0.1523 0.0089 0.277 0.0201 
11 - 15 0. 1458 0.0096 0.2388 0.035 
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Table 6c 
Differences between mean discount rates for gender. race, marital status, and education 
Test for differences in average discount T-statistic for within T-statistic for within T-statistic for differences between the 
rate between various categories the officer group the enlisted group officer group and the enlisted group 
Males vs. females 2.0727 8.6940 
Enlisted males vs. officer males 85.794 
Enlisted females VS. officer females 19.681 
Blacks vs. whites 1.959 9.831 
Enlisted whites vs. white officers 75.172 
Enlisted blacks vs. black officers 35.771 
Married vs. single 0.3279 1.4932 
Single officers vs. single enlisted 39.686. 
Married officers vs. married enlisted 78. 120 
Lowest educational level vs. the highest 4.6629 -2.5452 
Table 6a indicates that the average personal discount rate for enlisted personnel was significantly higher 
than that of officers across all characteristics listed in the table- gender, race, marital status, number of 
dependents, and all age categories. Tables 6c and 6d confirm that the average personal discount rates for 
enlisted personnel were statistically significantly higher, based on the I-statistics, than the average 
personal discount rates for officers across gender, race, marital status, number of dependents, and all age 
categories. This suggests that enlisted personnel had a higher rate of time preference and discounted future 
consumption at a higher rate; hence, as is consistent with the data, they were more likely to prefer lump-
sum SSB payments than annuity-like VSI payments. The statistical significance of differences in average 
discount rates by characteristic was largely consistent with the findings in Harrison et al. ' s (2002) civilian 
study. It was difficult to compare these with Warner and Pleeter's (200 I) study hecause they did not 
compare average discount rates by characteristic or examine the statistical significance of differences in 
discount rates . 
Table 6c suggests that there was a statistically significant difference in average discount rates (from 
Table 6a) between males and females both within the officer group and the enlisted group. Harrison et al.'s 
(2002) study of civilians in Denmark, on the other hand, did not find a statistically significantly different 
Table 6d 
Differences between mean discount rates for number of dependents, age. and rank 
Test for differences in average discount 
rate between various categories 
Individuals with 0- 3 dependents vs. over 3 
Enlisted vs. officers with 0- 3 dependents 
Enlisted vs. officers with more than 3 
dependents 
Youngest age group vs. the oldesl age group 
Enlisted vs. officers between 22 and 30 
Enlisted vs . officer.i between 31 and 35 
Enlisted vs. officers between 36 and 40 
Enlisted vs. officers between 41 and 46 
Lowest rank vs. the highest nmk 
T-statistic for within T-statistic for within T·statistic for differences between the 
the officer group the enlisted group officer group and the enlisted group 
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average discount rates between men and women. As is evident in Table 6a, blacks tended to have a 
slightly higher average personal discount rate than whites in both the officer category and the enlisted 
category; this result was statistically significant within both categories (Table 6c). Among officers and 
enlisted personnel, single and married individuals did not have statistically significantly different discount 
rates, which is consistent with Harrison et al. 's (2002) Danish study. Our analysis did not show a 
statistically significant difference in average discount rates within either the officer category or within the 
enlisted category between individuals with 0- 3 dependents versus individuals with over 3 dependents. 
For both enlisted personnel and officers, as age increased, the average personal discount rates fell. The 
difference between the youngest age category (22-30) and the oldest age category (41-46) was more 
substantial within the enlisted category than within the officer category. Harrison et al. (2002) also found 
that average discount rates declined with age. The I-stat istics in Table 6d suggested that the difference in 
average discount rates between the youngest age group and the oldest age group was statistically 
significant, both within the officer group and within the enlisted group. 
The average personal discount rate for enlisted personnel was significantly higher than that of officers 
across all characteristics listed in the table- rank, occupational code (MaS), educational level, and years 
of service (YOS) in Table 6b. The I-statistics in Tables 6c, 6d, and 6e indicate that the enlisted average 
personal discount rates by each demographic characteristic were statistically significantly higher than the 
comparable average discount rates for enlisted personnel. As rank increased, the average personal discount 
rate by rank declined for both officers and enlisted personnel, although the difference in average discount 
rates between the highest rank and the lowest rank was much greater for enlisted personnel than for officers 
(Table 6b). The I-statistics in the last line of Table 6d suggest that the differences between in average 
discount rate between the highest rank and the lowest rank were statistically significant, both within the 
officer group and within the enlisted group. Rank served as a proxy for income; consequently, the finding is 
similar to that of Harrison et al. (2002), who found that average discount rates declined with income. 
Table 6e indicates that the average personal discount rates between occupational codes or MOSs (from 
Table 6b) can significantly differ. Within the officer group, the difference in the average discount rate 
Table 6e 
T-statislics fo r differences between mean discount rates by MOS and VOS 
Test for differences in average discount 
rale between various categories 
T-statistic for within T-statistic for wi thin T-slatistic for differences between the 
the officer group the enlisted group officer group and the enlisted group 
Combat arms MOS vs. the aviation MOS 4.10 
Combat anns MOS vs. the combat 1.3568 
anns support MOS 
Combat anns support MOS vs . the 0.7071 
aviation MOS 
Enlisted VS . officers in the combat 
anns MOS 
Enlisted vs. officers in the combat 
anns support MOS 
Enlisted vs. o fficers in the aviation MOS 
Individuals wi th 4-10 yaS 0.2273 
vs. 1622 yaS 
Enlisted vs. officers with 4 -10 VOS 
Enlisted vs. officers with 11-15 vas 
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between the combat arms MOS and the aviation MOS was statistically significant, and within the enlisted 
group, the average discount rate between the combat arms MOS and the combat arms support MOS was 
statistically significant. As years of service increased, the average personal discount rate fell for enlisted 
personnel, although the average personal discount rate did not differ much for different ranges ofYOS for 
officers. Indeed, the average discount rate for the group with the lowest Y~S range (4- 10 YOS) did not 
differ significantly from the average discount rate for the group with the highest YOS range (16- 22 YOS) 
for officers, although the difference was statistically significant for enlisted personnel. 
For officers, as education increased, the average personal discount rate declined by educational level. 
The difference in the average discount rate between the lowest educational level and the highest 
educational level, both within the officer group and within the enlisted group, was statistically significant 
(Table 6c). Harrison et. al. also showed a negative relationship between education and discount rates. 
4.3. C. Comparison with previous studies 
The results of this study are consistent with the findings reported by Warner and Pleeter (1994) and 
Mackin (1995), who constructed similar models for the other branches of service. The average personal 
discount rate across all YOS for officers and for enlisted personnel, as well as at various levels ofYOS, are 
compared across studies in Table 7. Our average personal discount rate across all officers was 14.9%, 
which is comparable to the 19% found in Warner and Pleeter's (1994) study and Mackin's (1995) study. 
Within the officer group, the average estimates by Y~S were slightly lower than Warner and Pleeter's 
study and roughly similar to Mackin's study. Similarly, our average personal discount rate within the 
enlisted group was 24%, consisted with Warner and Pleeter (23%) and Mackin (20.9%). 
The results of this analysis are compared with those in Wamer and Pleeter's (200 I) study in Table 8. As 
discussed earlier, Warner and Pleeter's study examined the discount rales for Navy, Army, and Air Force 
officers/enlisted who were eligible to separate during 1992 and 1993 using DMDC dala while our study 
examines discount rales for the Marines during 1992- 1997 who separated under the VSI/SSB programs 
using TfDW data. Our results are more comparable to Warner and Pleeter's linear model. Across all Y~S 
for individuals who separated, Warner and Pleeter's officer category averages 12.9%, which is similar to 
our 14.9% while their enlisled category averages 36.9%, which is somewhal higher than our 24%. Under 
Table 7 
HenseUDeichert (2006) results compared to previous studies 
Sample Decision Warner and Mackin HensellDeichert HenscVDeichert HensellDeichert number 
point Plee!er (1994) (1995) estimates (2006) standard deviations of observations 
Officer All YOS 0.19 0.146 0.149 0.0158 493 
YOS 9 0.191 0.147 0.153 0.0091 75 
YOSI2 0.188 0.149 0.147 0.0089 22 
YOS 15 0.183 0.155 0.144 0.0127 17 
YOSI8 0.182 0.155 0.1 68 0.0844 II 
Enlisted All YOS 0.233 0.209 0.24 0.0396 2747 
YOS9 0.234 0.209 0.275 0.0204 112 
YOSI2 0.232 0.209 0.25t 0.0415 349 
YOSI5 0.229 0.205 0.207 0.029 315 
YOS 18 0.225 0.202 0.186 0.0268 81 
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Table 8 
HcnscVDeichert (2006) results compared to Wamer/Plecter (2001) 
Sample Decision point Warner and Pleeter (200 I ) Warner and Pleeter (200 I) HensellDeichert 
linear model loglinear model estimates (2006) 
Officer Leavers all yaS (entire sample) 0.129 (0.104) 0.210(0.187) 0.149 
yaS 9 0.159 0.381 0.153 
yaS 15 0 0.132 0.144 
Enlisted Leavers all vas (entire sample) 0.369 (0.354) 0.572 (0.536) 0.240 
yaS 9 0.381 0.607 0.275 
yaS 15 0.294 0.389 0.207 
Warner and Pleeter's loglinear model, discount rates in the 50-60% rate were estimated for enlisted 
personnel. Our analysis does not estimate discount rates that are so high but, regardless of the type of 
model used, buth our srudy and Warner and Pleeter found that officers had lower discount rates than 
enlisted personnel. This highlights the differences in current and future consumption behavior between 
the two groups. Moreover, the differences in discount rates between officers and enlisted personnel may 
parallel Harrison et al. 's (2002) finding in the civilian sector that skilled workers had a lower average 
discount rate than unskilled workers. 
5. Conclusion 
This research determined the discount rate that each individual Marine used to exchange present dollars 
for furure dollars during severance from the Marine Corps under either the VSI or SSB voluntary 
separation payment programs between 1992 and 1997. This analysis also determined those professional, 
personal, and economic factors that significantly influenced Marines in their separation payment option 
decisions. This study complements the study done by Warner and Pleeter (200 I) because it estimates the 
personal discount rates of Marines, while Warner and Pleeter examined Anny, Navy, and Air Force 
officers who separated during 1992 and 1993. The 1992- 1997 range used in our analysis has an 
additional advantage over the 1992-1993 period in that, for those separating afier the beginning of FY 
1993, the SSB vs. VSI decision was purely based on financial differences between the two programs. 
Nevertheless, prior to the passage of the FY 1993 Defense Authorization Act, SSB recipients had some 
advantages relative to VSI recipients. s Our analysis used data provided by the Marine Corps' Total Force 
Data Warehouse on the personal and professional traits of the 494 officers and 2747 enlisted Marines who 
separated using the VSI or SSB program. The methodology used to determine the personal discount rates 
for tbe Marines closely followed that used by Warner and Pleeter and Mackin (1995). The estimated 
personal discount rates detennined by this study averaged 14.9% for officers and 24% for enlisted 
Marines, which is consistent with prior estimates from Warner and Pleeter (1994, 200 I), and Mackin 
(1995). Warner and Pleeter (1994) estimated 19% for officers and 23.3% for enlisted personnel. Warner 
and Pleeter (2001) estimated 12.9% for officers and 36.9% for enlisted personnel in their linear model, 
and Mackin (1995) estimated 14.6% for officers and 20.9% for enlisted personnel. Although Warner and 
Pleeter's (200 I) study estimated much higher discount rates for enlisted personnel under their loglinear 
5 John Wamcr and Saul Pleeter's "The personal discount rate: Evidence from military downsizing programs." American 
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model than our analysis found, both studies consistently found that officers had lower discount rates than 
enlisted personnel. Moreover, the estimated discount rates in this analysis are consistent with civilian 
studies, such as Harrison et al. (2002), which estimated a discount rate of 28.1 % . 
Many of the characteristics impacting the probability of taking the SSB (lump-sum payment) had 
coefficients with the same sign in the officer model as they did in the enlisted model, although the 
statistical significance differed. For example, both officer and enlisted regression models indicated that 
females were less likely to take the lump-sum, although the effect was only statistically significant for 
enlisted personnel (at the 10% level). Both models suggested that blacks might be more likely to take the 
lump-sum payment, although the effect was only statistically significant for enlisted personnel (at the 1% 
level). As the number of dependents increased, both models suggested a greater tendency on the part of 
individuals to take the lump-sum payment, although the effect was only statistically significant for 
enlisted personnel (at close to the 5% level). Both age and yaS within the enlisted model had statistically 
significant negative effects (at the 10% level and at close to the I % level, respectively) on the tendency to 
take the lump-sum payment. Rank, marital status, and military occupational code were not significant in 
either model, once other effects, such as age and education, were controlled for. 
Graduate education in the officer model was statistically significant at the I % level, suggesting that 
more educated individuals were less likely to take the lump-sum payment; education effects were not 
significant in the enlisted model. The unemployment rate at the time of separation in the officer model was 
statistically significant at the I % level, suggesting that higher unemployment rates contributed to a greater 
tendency to take the lump-sum payment; this effect was not significant in the enlisted model, although the 
coefficient had the same sign as in the officer model. 
Both this analysis and Warner and Pleeter's (200 I) analysis highlighted the differences in the preference 
for current consumption vs. future consumption between officers and enlisted personnel. Within the 
civilian context, this may parallel the differences between skilled and unskilled workers found in Harrison 
et al. 's (2002) study on Danish civilians. Although the degree of statistical significance varied between the 
officer and enlisted models, the signs of the coefficients suggested that females were less likely to take the 
SSB option, blacks were more likely to take the SSB option, individuals with more dependents were more 
likely to take the SSB option, and that individuals with more years of service and greater education were 
less likely to take the SSB option. These results, consistent with those of Warner and Pleeter's (200 I) 
analysis, also paralleled those of Gilman (1976) and Black (1984), who found that individuals with more 
education and higher income had lower discount rates, and that blacks had higher discount rates than 
whites. Harrison et al. (2002) found that individuals with higher education, older individuals, and 
individuals with higher incomes had a statistically significantly lower discount rates. As a result, many of 
the relationships can be generalized beyond the military environment to assist in policy-making. 
In conclusion, various characteristics impact the tendency of individuals to prefer current consumption 
to future consumption. In many cases, controlling for other variables, these tendencies may not be 
statistically significant within certain populations. Nevertheless, an understanding of the interaction 
between age, gender, education, and race, and their corresponding impact on the future earnings stream 
available to individuals, is key in formulating retirement, force shaping, and savings rate policies. 
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